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Strategy and History comprises a selection of Professor Gray's key
contributions to strategic debate over the past thirty years. These
essays have been selected both because they had significant
messages for contemporary controversies, and because they have some
continuing relevance for today and the future. Each essay in this
book is really about strategy in the modern world, and reflects the
many dimensions of this complex subject. This book covers a wide
range of subjects and historical events, but there are key issues
covered throughout: being strategic the consequences of actions a
respect for Clausewitz's theory of war historical dependency the
importance of geography being critical of enthusiasm for technology
over human factors the primacy of politics. This important
publication provides an invaluable insight into the development of
strategic studies over the past 30 years from one of the world's
leading theorists and practitioners of the subject. The book will
be of great interest to all students and analysts of strategy and
international studies.
Strategy and History comprises a selection of Professor Gray's key
contributions to strategic debate over the past thirty years. These
essays have been selected both because they had significant
messages for contemporary controversies, and because they have some
continuing relevance for today and the future. Each essay in this
book is really about strategy in the modern world, and reflects the
many dimensions of this complex subject. This book covers a wide
range of subjects and historical events, but there are key issues
covered throughout: being strategic the consequences of actions a
respect for Clausewitz's theory of war historical dependency the
importance of geography being critical of enthusiasm for technology
over human factors the primacy of politics. This important
publication provides an invaluable insight into the development of
strategic studies over the past 30 years from one of the world's
leading theorists and practitioners of the subject. The book will
be of great interest to all students and analysts of strategy and
international studies.
Geopolitical conditions influence all strategic behaviour - even
when cooperation among different kinds of military power is
expected as the norm, action has to be planned and executed in
specific physical environments. The geographical world cannot be
avoided, and it happens to be 'organized' into land, sea, air and
space - and possibly the electromagnetic spectrum including
'cyberspace'. Although the meaning of geography for strategy is a
perpetual historical theme, explicit theory on the subject is only
one hundred years old. Ideas about the implication of geographical,
especially spatial, relationships for political power - which is to
say 'geopolitics'- flourished early in the twentieth century.
Divided into theory and practice sections, this volume covers the
big names such as Mackinder, Mahan and Haushofer, as well as
looking back at the vital influence of weather and geography on
naval power in the long age of sail (sixteenth to nineteenth
centuries). It also looks forward to the consequences of the
revival of geopolitics in post-Soviet Russia and the new
space-based field of "astropolitics".
Airpower for Strategic Effect is intended to contribute to the
understanding of airpower-what it is, what it does, why it does it,
and what the consequences are. This is the plot: airpower generates
strategic effect. Airpower's product is strategic effect on the
course of strategic history. Everything about military airpower is
instrumental to the purpose of securing strategic effect.
Geopolitical conditions influence all strategic behaviour - even
when co-operation among different kinds of military power is
expected as the norm, action has to be planned and executed in
specific physical environments. The geographical world cannot be
avoided, and it happens to "organized" into land, sea, air and
space - and possibly the electromagnetic spectrum including
"cyberspace." Although the meaning of geography for strategy is a
perpetual historical theme, explicit theory on the subject is only
100 years old. Ideas about the implication of geographical,
especially spatial, relationships for political power - which is to
say "geopolitics" - flourished early in the 20th century.
Divided into theory and practice sections, this volume covers the
big names such as Mackinder, Mahan and Haushofer as well as looking
back at the vital influence of weather and geography on naval power
in the long age of sail (16th-19th centuries). It also looks
forward to the consequences of the revival of geopolitics in
post-Soviet Russia and the new space-based field of
"astropolitics."
This volume examines geopolitics by looking at the interaction
between geography, strategy and history. This book addresses three
interrelated questions: why does the geographical scope of
political objectives and subsequent strategy of states change? How
do these changes occur? Over what period of time do these changes
occur? The theories of Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman
are examined in order to provide an analytical narrative for five
case studies, four historical and one contemporary. Taken together
they offer the prospect of converting descriptions of historical
change into analytic explanations, thereby highlighting the
importance of a number of commonly overlooked variables. In
addition, the case studies will illuminate the challenges that
states face when attempting to change the scope of their foreign
policy and geo-strategy in response to shifts in the geopolitical
reality. This book breaks new ground in seeking to provide a way to
understand why and how the geographical scope of political
objectives and subsequent strategy both expands and contracts. This
book will be of much interest to students of geopolitics, strategic
studies, military history, and international relations.
This book examines the subject of strategy and its relationship
with politics. Despite the fact that strategy is always the product
of political process, the relationship between the two concepts and
their ancillary activities has scarcely been touched by scholars.
This book corrects that serious deficiency, and explains the high
relevance of political factors for matters of general defence. Each
chapter aims to show how and why strategy and politics interact and
how this interaction has had significant consequences historically.
Neither strategy nor politics can make sense if considered alone.
Strategy requires direction that can only be provided by political
process, while politics cannot be implemented without strategy. In
summary, this volume will explain: what strategy is (and is not)
why strategy is essential what strategy does and how it does it how
strategy is made and executed Written by a leading scholar and
former practitioner, this book will be essential reading for all
students of military strategy, strategic studies, security studies
and war and conflict studies.
This book examines the subject of strategy and its relationship
with politics. Despite the fact that strategy is always the product
of political process, the relationship between the two concepts and
their ancillary activities has scarcely been touched by scholars.
This book corrects that serious deficiency, and explains the high
relevance of political factors for matters of general defence. Each
chapter aims to show how and why strategy and politics interact and
how this interaction has had significant consequences historically.
Neither strategy nor politics can make sense if considered alone.
Strategy requires direction that can only be provided by political
process, while politics cannot be implemented without strategy. In
summary, this volume will explain: what strategy is (and is not)
why strategy is essential what strategy does and how it does it how
strategy is made and executed Written by a leading scholar and
former practitioner, this book will be essential reading for all
students of military strategy, strategic studies, security studies
and war and conflict studies.
This volume examines geopolitics by looking at the interaction
between geography, strategy and history. This book addresses three
interrelated questions: why does the geographical scope of
political objectives and subsequent strategy of states change? How
do these changes occur? Over what period of time do these changes
occur? The theories of Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman
are examined in order to provide an analytical narrative for five
case studies, four historical and one contemporary. Taken together
they offer the prospect of converting descriptions of historical
change into analytic explanations, thereby highlighting the
importance of a number of commonly overlooked variables. In
addition, the case studies will illuminate the challenges that
states face when attempting to change the scope of their foreign
policy and geo-strategy in response to shifts in the geopolitical
reality. This book breaks new ground in seeking to provide a way to
understand why and how the geographical scope of political
objectives and subsequent strategy both expands and contracts. This
book will be of much interest to students of geopolitics, strategic
studies, military history, and international relations.
What is commonly known as history is really the past, as it is
often selected and preserved both by professional historians and by
non-specialist citizens. The past is such a large and diverse
repository of happenings, thoughts, and experiences that it
requires treatment with a disciplined respect. Frequently, respect
for the truth about the past is a victim of contemporary
circumstance. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray seeks to explore
how historical data might best be used for the benefit of the U.S.
Army and, therefore, the United States. He pulls no punches in
explaining how challenging it is to penetrate the fog that obscures
much of the past. Since the future cannot be foreseen reliably, we
are left rather uncomfortably with a seemingly ever changing today.
The strategic quality of Landpower is widely known, but not widely
understood. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray explores and
explains the meaning of strategic Landpower. He is concerned
particularly to argue that, although Landpower today must function
in a joint environment, typically it is the dominant element in the
team for U.S. national security. The monograph lays emphasis upon
the place of the human domain that leads in the role played by
ground forces in strategy. Because of some widespread conceptual
misuse, many people are not used to thinking of Landpower as a
strategic instrument for American security policy. Dr. Gray aspires
to help reduce the popularity of this important misconception. It
is necessary for good policy that American Landpower should be
considered and debated properly, which is to say in appropriate
strategic terms.
To define future threat is, in a sense, an impossible task, yet it
is one that must be done. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray
explains that the only sources of empirical evidence accessible to
us are the past and the present. We cannot obtain understanding
about the future from the future. Dr. Gray draws noticeably upon
the understanding of strategic history obtainable from Thucydides'
great History of the Peloponnesian War. The monograph advises
prudence as the operating light for American definition of future
threat, and the author believes that there are historical parallels
between the time of Thucydides and our own that can help us avoid
much peril. The future must always be unpredictable to us in any
detail, but the many and potent continuities in history's great
stream of time can serve to alert us to what may well happen in
kind.
The United States has long suffered from a serious strategy
deficit. For so long as Americans short change the strategic
function, the leverage of US airpower must be much less than its
potential. The study argues strongly for the rigorous application
of strategic discipline to all airpower activity, not only the
kinetic.
The United States was thrust so suddenly into the war on terrorism
that it was forced to deal with both immediate operational issues
and broad strategic questions simultaneously. Even while the
American military is consolidating battlefield success in
Afghanistan, strategic thinkers and leaders are developing a
long-term strategy. In this process, nothing is more important than
defining victory. In this monograph, Dr. Colin Gray, one of the
world's leading strategic thinkers, explores the concept of victory
in the war in terrorism, but he does so by placing it within the
larger currents of change that are sweeping the global security
environment. He contends that the time-tested idea of decisive
victory is still an important one, but must be designed very
carefully in this dangerous new world. To do so correctly can
provide the foundation for an effective strategy. To fail to do so
could be the first step toward strategic defeat.
The possibility of achieving decisive results from short warning
attacks appears to have improved greatly with technological
advances. Indeed, strategic surprise offers both golden
opportunities and lethal dangers, so it attracts much attention in
today's world. In this monograph, Dr. Colin Gray takes a broad view
of strategic surprise, and relates it to the current military
transformation. He argues that the kind of strategic surprise to
which the United States is most at risk and which is most damaging
to our national security is the deep and pervasive connection
between war and politics. Although America is usually superior at
making war, it is far less superior in making peace out of war. Dr.
Gray concludes that the current military transformation shows no
plausible promise of helping to correct the long-standing U.S.
weakness in the proper use of forces as an instrument of policy.
This monograph was written under the Strategic Studies Institute's
External Research Associates Program (ERAP).
If RMA (revolution in military affairs) was the acronym and concept
of choice in the U.S. defense community in the 1990s, so preemption
has threatened to supercede it in the 2000s. The trouble is that
officials and many analysts have confused preemption, which is not
controversial, with prevention, which is. In this monograph, Dr.
Colin S. Gray draws a sharp distinction between preemption and
prevention, and explains that the political, military, moral, and
strategic arguments have really all been about the latter, not the
former. Dr. Gray provides definitions, reviews the history of the
preventive war option, and considers the merit, or lack thereof, in
the principal charges laid against the concept when it is
proclaimed to be policy. Dr. Gray concludes that there is a place
for preventive war in U.S. strategy, but that it is an option that
should be exercised only very occasionally. However, there are
times when only force seems likely to resolve a maturing danger.
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was the most widely used, and
abused, acronym in the U.S. defense community in the 1990s.
Subsequently, transformation has superceded it as the preferred
term of art. For the better part of 2 decades, American defense
professionals have been excited by the prospect of effecting a
revolutionary change in the conduct and character of warfare. In
this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray provides a critical audit of the
great RMA debate and of some actual RMA behavior. He argues that
the contexts of warfare are crucially important. Indeed so vital
are the contexts that only a military transformation that allows
for flexibility and adaptability will meet future strategic
demands. Dr. Gray warns against a transformation that is highly
potent only in a narrow range of strategic cases. In addition, he
advises that the historical record demonstrates clearly that every
revolutionary change in warfare eventually is more or less
neutralized by antidotes of one kind...
At present and probably for some years to come, America's enemies
are of an irregular character. These irregular enemies necessarily
wage war in modes that are largely unconventional. In this
monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray considers irregular warfare in the
light of the general theory of strategy and finds that that theory
is fully adequate to explain the phenomenon. Rather less adequate,
Dr. Gray suggests, is the traditional American way of war. The
monograph offers a detailed comparison between the character of
irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal
enduring features of "the American way." It concludes that there is
a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that
is most effective in countering irregular foes. Dr. Gray poses the
question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat
context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer
is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."
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